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Global Economic and Financial Crisis: Exploring the Transmission Channels and 
Impacts on sub-Saharan African Economies 
 
Abstract 
Over the past decade sub-Saharan African countries have made remarkable gains in 
promoting growth alongside economic stability. However, with the outbreak of the financial 
and economic crisis in advanced economies, will these hard-won economic gains in the 
region be threatened?  In this paper, we seek to provide an overview of how sub-Saharan 
African countries are exposed to the crisis through both financial and real transmission 
channels, and to critically assess the impact of the crisis on different economies. To 
accomplish this task, we first provide an overview of the recent economic development of 
sub-Saharan African countries, and a brief discussion of the sources and the development of 
the crisis. We then proceed to explore the direct financial transmission channels of the crisis 
and their impacts on sub-Saharan African countries. In addition, we explore the indirect real 
transmission channels of the crisis and how the sub-Saharan African economies are impacted 
by them. Thereafter, we identify a couple of policy implications. 
 
JEL classification: F02, G01, G15,  
Keywords: Global financial and economic crisis; transmission mechanisms; sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1. Introduction 
 
The global economic and financial crisis that started with the bursting of the housing bubbles 
in the United States led to general concern about credit quality in the advanced economies, 
unanticipated contagion to other financial assets and a sharp retrenchment of credit to various 
sectors and economic agents. The crisis affected advanced economies, emerging markets and 
developing countries in very different ways (see Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011). Advanced 
economies were first hit mainly by the systemic banking crisis in the United States and 
Europe. Emerging markets with well-developed financial systems were initially mostly 
affected by cross-border financial linkages through capital flows and exchange rates. In 
developing countries of which most of the sub-Saharan African countries belong to, the 
effects on real factors such as trade, tourism, workers’ remittances, and official development 
assistance dominated. 
 
The previous studies have mainly focused on the effects of the financial crisis on the 
advanced and emerging market economies (see, for instance, Dooley and Hutchison, 2009; 
Claessens et al., 2010). Even though there are studies exploring the impacts of the financial 
crisis on the sub-Saharan African economies, some of the impacts are reported based on the 
estimated or expected data during the period of the crisis [see, for example, Massa and Velde, 
2008; African Development Bank (ADB), 2009; Arief et al., 2009].  Hence, there is still room 
for further study of the financial crisis, especially from the perspective of developing 
economies with the recent data obtained from various reliable sources. Our aim is to therefore 
explore the direct financial transmission and indirect real channels of the financial crisis and 
to explore its effect on sub-Saharan African countries. Over the past decade, sub-Saharan 
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Africa has made remarkable gains in promoting growth with economic stability. Real GDP 
growth averaged 5.9 percent over the period of 2004 to 2008; inflation had fallen to single-
digit levels before the fuel and food prices shock of 2008 and reserves were accumulated [see 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2009a]. These positive developments relied on effective 
economic policies, a favourable external environment, debt relief and foreign aid. However, 
these hard-won economic gains are being threatened. Relatively weak financial linkages with 
advanced economies have not shielded African countries from the global economic storm. 
Demand for African exports has fallen, commodity prices have declined and workers’ 
remittance flows are weakening. The tightening of global credit conditions is reducing 
foreign direct investment and reversing portfolio flows, making trade finance more costly. 
The economic slowdown also increases credit risk and non-performing assets, weakening the 
balance sheets of financial institutions and corporations.  
 
In the next section, an overview of how sub-Saharan African countries are exposed to the 
crisis through the direct financial transmission channels is provided, with the critical 
assessment on the impacts on different economies. Section 3 explores the indirect real 
transmission channel of the crisis and how the sub-Saharan African economies are impacted 
by it. Inter alia, these two sections provide detailed exploration of the spillover effects of the 
crisis on the sub-Saharan African countries, in addition to identifying their sources. Since the 
financial systems in the sub-Saharan African countries are so heterogeneous, their exposure 
to the crisis varies greatly. The focus is therefore more on highlighting those countries being 
mostly affected by a particular channel. The last section provide a conclusion as well as point 
out some policy implications. 
2. Direct Transmission Channels   
 
When the financial crisis broke out in 2007, there was a general perception that sub-Saharan 
African countries would only be affected in a limited extent, due to the limited exposure to 
the developed financial systems in the United States and other European countries (see ADB, 
2009). Indeed, African countries have been adversely affected by the crisis in both direct and 
indirect ways. In this section, we explore three direct transmission channels due to the direct 
exposure to the international financial systems. They include the effects through capital 
markets, banking sector, and private capital flows.  
 
2.1 Capital markets 
 
Before we explore the effects of the capital markets on sub-Saharan African countries, it is 
important to know that these countries are so heterogeneous that their exposure to the crisis 
varies greatly. In terms of financial depth and the degree of capital and financial market 
development, there are three distinct groups. These are: emerging market group, frontier 
market group, and financially developing group1 (see IMF, 2009a). In this section, we are 
                                                          
1 Emerging market group only consists of South Africa. Frontier market countries include Botswana, Cape 
Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
Financially developing countries include Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep. of, Congo, Rep. of, Côte d’lvoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, 
Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Zimbabwe. 
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going to discuss the impacts of the crisis on the sub-Saharan Africa through channels of stock 
market, bonds market and foreign exchange market in turn. 
 
Stock market developments serve as an important transmission channel of the global financial 
crisis to the economies. In general, the crisis is associated with increased price volatility, 
decline in stock market indices, decline in initial public offerings, wealth losses, and the so 
called “second round” effect on financial systems (see IMF, 2009a, 2009b; Aryeetey and 
Ackah, 2011). In the case of sub-Saharan African countries, the stock markets across the 
region experienced a sharp correction due to the crisis. According to the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) (2010), the stock market indices for Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda 
and Zambia declined dramatically during the period of 2008 to 2009, after two years of 
double digit returns in the stock markets. In particular, the stock market indices of Egypt and 
Nigeria dropped by about 67 percent during March 2008 to March 2009 (see Aryeetey and 
Ackah, 2011). IMF (2009a) also reported that stocks indices for Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia registered large declines in dollar terms in 2008. 
Only three markets, namely, Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania, closed in 2008 with positive 
returns. Furthermore, the unfavourable performance of stock markets might also undermine 
the performance of large domestic institutional investors like pension funds and life insurance 
companies. Nevertheless, the impact of the stock market declines on wealth has been limited, 
largely because of the relatively small size of stock markets. In addition, the impact of the 
stock market declines on the financial system has also been limited, mainly due to the prudent 
regulations which limit the direct exposure of banks to equities. Only a few countries 
including Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda that the banking sectors have been 
affected by the stock market declines (IMF, 2009a).  
 
 
In bonds markets, several sub-Saharan African countries came under intense pressure as the 
liquidity in global credit markets declined. For instance, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and 
Zambia registered significant outflows from their domestic debt markets. In addition, 
unfavourable capital market condition also led several countries to postpone their bond 
issuance plans (see Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011). For example, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
postponed their bond issuance plans due to the increased risk premia resulted from the 
financial crisis (Kasekende et al., 2009). In the case of South Africa, although she did not 
heavily rely on international borrowing, she was affected by the increase in sovereign 
spreads. Such increase reflected the investor liquidity needs and flights to higher quality 
assets (IMF, 2009a). Table 1 shows the issuance of international bonds in sub-Saharan 
African countries during the period of 2004 to 2008.   
 
 
Table 1: Issuance of international bonds in sub-Saharan Africa, 2004-08 (millions of US 
dollars) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total 1,697 2,681 4,899 12,396 1,533 
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 
Ghana 0 0 0 950 0 
Nigeria 0 0 0 525 0 
Seychelles 0 0 200 107 0 
South Africa 1,697 2,681 4,699 9,814 1,533 
Source: IMF (2009a) 
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On the foreign exchange markets, the exchange rate in the region2 was under pressure due to 
the portfolio outflows triggered by increased risk aversion and deleveraging, sharp declines in 
foreign direct investment, and the unwinding of commodity trade. In particular, the 
currencies of the relatively open economies such as Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa, Uganda 
and Zambia came under some pressure and depreciated against the dollar (see IMF, 2009a; 
2009b). Such exchange rate depreciation pressure and volatility had been persistent for some 
time because of various factors. They included the highly uncertain pace of global recovery, 
geographical rebalancing of trade flows, and volatility in the exchange rates of the main 
currencies. As a result of the continued exchange rate volatility, it posted particular 
challenges for countries seeking to integrate with international capital markets.  Literature 
suggests that financial integration may act as a catalyst for economic growth, which 
facilitates more rapid investment in infrastructure and private sector development, enhances 
competition, and encourages foreign direct investment and technology transfer (see for 
example, Eichengreen et al, 1998; Agénor, 2003). However, increased exchange rate 
volatility could hinder financial integration, skewing capital flows from longer-term to short-
term investment, thereby affecting economic growth in the region. 
 
2.2 Banking sector 
 
Banking sector is generally considered to be a major channel through which the direct 
impacts of the financial and economic crisis would be transmitted through the cross-border 
activities between banks. The crisis could cause a decline in international bank lending, 
which might lead to bank failures and credit tightening (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011). In the 
case of sub-Saharan African countries, financial institutions were relatively resilient due to a 
number of factors. For instance, studies suggest that most African banks had limited exposure 
to the sub-prime mortgage market and asset-backed securities [see Massa and Velde, 2008; 
United Nations Economic and Social Council/Economic Commission for Africa/African 
Union Commission (UNESC/ECA/AUC), 2009]. In addition, African banking systems in 
general had limited exposure to complex financial instruments. This resulted in fewer 
exposures and risks of potential losses (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011). In fact, the banking 
systems in the region were characterised by abundant low-cost domestic deposits and 
liquidity. This allowed banks to finance themselves with domestic funds. Furthermore, the 
existence of capital control in several countries, such as Nigeria, Ghana, helped to moderate 
the direct and indirect effects of the crisis on the banking systems (IMF, 2009a).  
 
Despite the impact of crisis on the banking sector was limited, the banks’ flow of credit to the 
private sector declined in most countries (see Ackah et al., 2009). For example, in Ghana, 
there was a continuous tightening of credit conditions for enterprises since December 2008. 
The credit to household for property purchase also declined significantly in the last quarter of 
2008 (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011). In the case of Kenya, the growth of the banks’ flow of 
credit to the private sector declined from 7.4 percent in the third quarter of 2008 to 2.5 
percent in the last quarter of the same year (Aryeetey, 2009). The decline in credit flow to 
private sector appears to be quite similar for many other African countries. As a result of the 
credit tightening, many of the SMEs and household will be affected (Aryeetey and Ackah, 
2011). 
 
                                                          
2 CFA zone countries have been insulated due to their pegged regime and more restrictive capital account 
framework. 
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In addition, countries that have significant foreign banking ownership in the banking systems 
might be adversely affected by the crisis in threefold: (i) parent banks might be less willing to 
provide liquidity to their African subsidiaries; (ii) parent banks might be tempted to withdraw 
funds from their African subsidiaries in order to offset losses in home countries; and (iii) 
parent banks might be unwilling or unable to inject additional needed capital into African 
subsidiaries. All these will increase African banks’ chances for bankruptcy (see Ackah et al., 
2009, IMF 2009a). Table 2 shows the African countries with concentrated foreign banking 
assets in 2008. As indicated in Table 2, the majority of banking assets in the African banks 
were foreign-owned, which were vulnerable to the banking crisis experienced in their parent 
banks. 
 
Table 2: African countries with concentrated foreign banking assets, 2008 
Host Country Assets 
Held by 
Foreign 
Banks 
(percent) 
Largest Foreign Banks Home Countries of the  
Largest Foreign Banks 
Angola 68 Angolan Development Bank Portugal 
  Espiritu Santo Bank of Angola (BESA) Portugal 
  Totta Angola Bank (BTA) Portugal 
Botswana 99 Barclays Bank of Botswana United Kingdom 
  Standard Chartered Bank Botswana United Kingdom 
  First National Bank of Botswana South Africa 
Cameroon 70 BICEC France 
  Société Générale France 
  Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 
Cape Verde 74 Banco Comercial Atlantico Portugal 
  Banco Interatlantico Portugal 
  Banco Caboverdiano de negocios Portugal 
Chad 75 Société Générale Tchadienne de Banque (SGTB) France  
  Ecobank Togo 
  Commercial Bank Tchad Cameroon 
Comoros 92 Banque pour l’Industrie et le Commerce (BIC) France 
  EXIM Bank Tanzania Tanzania 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 90 Banque Congolaise United States 
  Banque Commericale du Congo (BCDC) Belgium 
  Rawbank Luxemburg 
Congo, Republic of 57 BGFI – Congo Gabon 
  Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur (BMCE) Morocco 
  Crédit Agricole France 
Côte d’lvoire 56 Société Générale France 
  Banque Internationale pour le Commerce & I’Industrie en 
Côte d’lvoire (BICICI) 
Belgium 
  Ecobank Togo 
Ghana 55 Barclays Bank United Kingdom 
  Standard Chartered Bank United Kingdom 
  SSB Bank France 
Lesotho 97 Standard Bank South Africa 
Madagascar 71 Mauritius Commercial Bank (MCB) Mauritius 
  Banque Malgache de L’Océan Indien (BMOI) France 
  BFV- Société Générale (SG) France 
Mauritius 72 Barclays Bank United Kingdom 
  Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) 
Mauritius Ltd. 
United Kingdom 
  Standard Chartered Bank United Kingdom 
Mozambique 100 Banco Internacional de Mocambique (BIM) Portugal 
  BCI-Fomento Portugal 
  Standard Bank South Africa 
Namibia 73 Standard Bank Namibia South Africa 
  First National Bank South Africa 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
100 Banco Internacional de STP (BISTP) Portugal 
  Afriland First Bank Cameroon 
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  Island Bank Nigeria 
Senegal 65 SGBS France 
  B.I.C.I.S. France 
  Attijariwafa Bank Morocco 
Seychelles 56 Barclays Bank United Kingdom 
  Mauritius Commercial Bank (MCB) Mauritius 
  Bank of Baroda India 
Swaziland 70 Standard Chartered Bank of Swaziland Ltd. United Kingdom 
  NedBank Swaziland Ltd. South Africa 
  First National Bank Swaziland Ltd. South Africa 
Tanzania 52 NBC Ltd. United Kingdom 
  Stanchart United Kingdom 
  Barclays Bank United Kingdom 
Source: IMF, 2009a 
 
2.3 Private capital flows 
2.3.1 Foreign direct investment  
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been regarded as an important engine of economic 
growth in Africa recently. In particular, the FDI inflows to tourism or traditional 
manufacturing sectors promote domestic employment, consumption and economic growth 
(see Bonassi et al., 2006; Allen and Giovannetti, 2011). Unlike other developing countries, 
FDI to the region is unevenly distributed across countries and highly concentrated in the 
countries with rich natural resource endowment (Allen and Giovannetti, 2011). For instance,  
four resource rich countries, namely, Angola, Chad, Nigeria and Sudan had accounted for 70 
percent of the total FDI during the period of 2000 to 2005 (OECD, 2008). In the early 2008, 
Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, and Nigeria, each attracted more than US$1 
billion FDI inflows in their countries. However, due to the financial crisis, credit was 
tightened and the profits were lowered in the firms of the developed countries. As a result, 
they might need to downsize their investment plans and adopted a wait-and-see attitude. 
There were a number of cancellations and postponements in the investment in natural 
resources and manufacturing in the region. For example, the mining projects in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia were cancelled while the mining projects in 
Botswana and Tanzania were postponed. Also, the refinery project in Sudan was postponed 
(ADB, 2010). 
 
Despite there were a number of cancellations and postponements in the investment projects, 
the impact of reduced FDI in the region was mild compared with other developing countries. 
It was because most of the FDI inflows were concentrated in natural resource sectors. Even 
the new projects might be delayed but most ongoing projects would likely to be continued. It 
was mainly due to the consideration of sizable up-front capital investment required for such 
investment and losses associated with withdrawing from natural resource projects prior to 
their completion. As a result, the likelihood of FDI withdrawal was reduced (IMF, 2009a). 
Some studies even argued that financial crisis might increase FDI inflows to the region.  It 
was because tough economic conditions might offer opportunity to buy assets at a “bargain 
prices”. It also offered a good chance to some industries such as automotive, financial 
services, metal mining, and oil and gas, to increase their operation scales [see United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2009; Allen and Giovannetti, 2011]. 
 
When we look at the net FDI inflows to the region in general, it has been increasing in 
absolute terms since 2000. The net inflows of FDI increased from US$6.55 billion in 2000 to 
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US$13.98 billion in 2001. The growth momentum continued in the early 2000s. The FDI 
inflows increased from US$ 13.98 billion in 2001 to US$15.38 billion in 2006. In 2007,  the 
net FDI inflows amounted to about US$28 billion, which represented a 82 percent annual 
growth, and they continued to grow until 2008 (WDI, 2016). The impressive growth of FDI 
was mainly due to the fact that investment in the region offered diversification opportunities, 
and relatively higher return rates than those in mature economies (Massa and Velde, 2008). 
When we consider the reduction of net FDI inflows to the region due to the financial crisis, 
the impact was relatively mild and not persistent. The net FDI inflows dropped from 
US$34.57 billion in 2008 to US$25.33 billion in 2009. However, it immediately increased to 
US$39.15 billion in 2010, which was a record high level in 2010s (WDI, 2016). Figure 1 
shows the trend of net FDI inflows to sub-Saharan African countries during the period of 
2000 to 2011. 
 
Figure 1: The trend of net FDI inflows to sub-Saharan African countries, 2000 - 2011. 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on WDI (2016). 
 
2.3.1 Portfolio investment 
 
In addition to the foreign direct investment, portfolio investment to the region was adversely 
affected by the financial crisis. During the past decade, some stock exchanges in the region 
such as the ones in Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria and Uganda, had experienced an 
extraordinary performance, thereby attracting an increasing share of portfolio inflows (Massa 
and Velde, 2008). For instance, the net portfolio inflows to the region increased from US$4.2 
billion in 2000 to US$16.81 billion in 2006 (WDI, 2016). However, the financial crisis put 
the portfolio investment in the region at risk due to various reasons. They included: the 
heightened risk aversion of investors; the tightening of global credit conditions; the 
deterioration of the macroeconomic environment in the region; and the increased volatility of 
capital markets and exchange rates. All these factors had led to a reduction of portfolio 
inflows to sub-Saharan Africa (Massa and Velde, 2008). The effect was more serious in the 
countries with developed stock market. For example, in South Africa, about US$1 billion in 
portfolio investment left the country during the third quarter of 2008. This situation continued 
to be worsening with about US$5.7 billion in portfolio investment outflows during the fourth 
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quarter of the same year (IMF, 2009a). To provide a general picture of the region, the net 
portfolio investment flows reduced from US$10.17 billion in 2007 to negative US$5.63 
billion in 2008 due to the financial crisis,. The good news was that the adverse effect was not 
persistent. In 2009, the net portfolio investment flows recovered swiftly to US$10.75 billion 
and later further increased to US$15.97 billion in 2010 (WDI, 2016). Figure 2 shows the 
trend of net portfolio inflows to sub-Saharan African countries during the period of 2000 to 
2011. Figure 3 shows the trend of net FDI, net portfolio investment, and net private capital 
flows to sub-Saharan African countries during the period of 2000 to 2011. 
 
Figure 2: The trend of net portfolio inflows to sub-Saharan African countries, 2000 - 2011. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on WDI (2016). 
 
Figure 3:  The trend of net FDI, net portfolio investment, and net private capital flows to sub-
Saharan African countries, 2000 - 2011. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on WDI (2016). 
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3. Indirect Real Transmission Channels   
 
The global economic and financial crisis has spilled over from the financial economies to the 
real economies, leading to serious negative impacts on the real sector of the economies. There 
are a number of important transmission channels which the crisis can affect sub-Saharan 
African countries. In the study, we mainly focus on trade, tourism, workers’ remittances, and 
official development assistance.  
3.1 Trade  
 
Many of the sub-Saharan African countries rely on exports markets as their engines for 
economic growth. Some studies suggested that trade was considered to be the most important 
crisis transmission for the region (see, for example, ODI, 2010; Berman and Martin, 2012). 
There are two mechanisms through which a financial crisis in the developed countries can 
affect the export of other countries. The first one is the income effect due to the sharp 
economic recession brought by the crisis. The second one is the disruption effect in the form 
of fall in trade finance (Berman and Martin, 2012).  In the case of the sub-Saharan African 
countries, Berman and Martin (2012) found that African exports were more sensitive to large 
decline in income of their trading partners. They also found that the disruptive effect was 
more severe and long lasting for African countries than the exporters of other regions.  
 
Due to these two transmission mechanisms, there was a sharp decline in export prices and 
also trade volumes. Before the outbreak of the crisis, countries whom were oil rich and 
agriculture net exporters benefited from increase in fuel and food prices3. The continuous 
demand for natural resources had caused the export prices and terms of trade to improve 
steadily throughout the region since 2003. However, the crisis and the lower global growth 
demand for the region’s exports led to a fall in export prices. There was a sharp adjustment in 
prices of oil, metals and other commodities in 2008 (see World Bank, 2009). The decline in 
global commodity prices adversely affected those African commodity exporters. The lower 
prices represented a significant loss in incomes and caused a sharp deterioration in their 
current account positions. For example, copper price fell from US$ 90000 per metric ton in 
June 2008 to around UD$ 30000 in December 2008. It adversely affected the terms of trade 
and the export earnings of major exporters such as Zambia and Democratic Republic of 
Congo (see Kabuya and Cassimon, 2010; Esser, 2013).  Overall, the terms of trade 
deteriorated in 19 of 44 countries in the region between July 2008 and May 2009, with 
income losses of more than 10 percent of GDP in 7 of them (see IMF, 2009a).  
 
In addition, the trade volumes were seriously affected by the crisis. As shown in figure 4, the 
growth in exports of goods and services in the region was positive and booming during the 
period of 2004 to 2008. The growth rate plunged from 9 percent in 2008 to negative 15 
percent in 2009. Nevertheless, it rebounded swiftly to 20 percent in 2010 (WDI, 2016).  
                                                          
3 The group of oil-exporting countries includes Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria. The group of non-oil resource-rich countries includes Botswana, Côte 
d’lvoire, Guinea, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Zambia. Countries are classified as resource-
rich if their primary commodity rents exceed 10 percent of GDP. The group of non-resource-rich countries are 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep. of, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
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Perhaps, based on the historical data, one can argue that the transmission through trade was 
important but not as long lasting as other studies suggested. 
 
Figure 4: Growth in exports of goods and services in sub-Saharan Africa, 2004 -11  
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on WDI (2016). 
 
3.2 Tourism 
International tourism receipts are important sources of revenue to the region. They account 
for about 4 percent of GDP of 29 sub-Saharan African countries, such as Cape Verde, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, among others. Due to the financial crisis, 
countries which relied on tourism were negatively affected by the decline in tourists and the 
associated fall in foreign exchange earnings. It was evident that the growth rate of 
international tourist arrivals to the region declined from 7.5 percent in 2007 to 4.2 percent in 
2008 [see United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 2009a]. For example, 
Cape Verde and Gambia were suffered from declines in tourism receipts in the fourth quarter 
of 2008 and it continued in 2009 (UNWTO, 2009b). Moreover, the slowdown in tourist 
arrivals might spread to other related services sector such as hotels, and restaurants (Aryeetey 
and Ackah, 2011). 
 
3.3 Workers’ remittances 
 
Remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa have experienced a significant growth recently, 
which serve as a powerful poverty reduction mechanism in the region. It increased from a 
value of US$3.2 billion in 1995 to US$25.9 billion in 2007, in which about 80 percent of its 
remittances came from advanced countries (see IMF, 2009a; WDI, 2016). The potential 
impact of the financial turmoil on remittent flows on the developing countries has been a 
matter of debate since the onset of the financial crisis. Some argue that the crisis would lead 
to a decline in the remittent flows. It is because the workers whom work in the worsening 
macroeconomic condition in the developed countries would find it difficult to send the same 
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amount of money abroad. On the contrary, some argue that the crisis would lead to an 
increase in the remittent flows. It is because the remittance senders may try to respond to the 
adverse macroeconomic condition in their home countries by sending more money home (see 
Franke 2009; Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011).   
 
In the case of the sub-Saharan Africa, we found that the remittance flows to the region 
continued to increase from US$25.9 billion in 2007 to US$28.5 billion in 2008. It only 
declined slightly to US$27.2 billion in 2009, and started to pick up its growth momentum in 
2010. Figure 5 shows the trend of personal remittances, received (current billion US$) during 
the period of 1995 to 2011 
 
 
Figure 5: The trend of personal remittances, received (current billion US$), 1995-2011 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on WDI (2016). 
 
When we consider the importance of remittent inflows in sub-Saharan Africa, we find that 
the region is dependent on remittances. According to the calculation from the World Bank 
(2009), about 2.5 percent of regional GDP came from remittances.  In particular, remittances 
accounted for more than 20 percent of GDP in Comoros and Lesotho. Also, there were ten 
other countries, which remittent inflows accounted for more than 5 percent of GDP. Figure 6 
show top 25 recipients of personal remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2008. Figure 7 
shows the impact of crisis on personal remittances in top five recipients’ countries. It shows 
that countries such as Lesotho, Togo and Nigeria were hard hit by the financial crisis through 
the channel of remittent inflows.   
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Figure 6: Top 25 recipients of personal remittances in sub-Saharan Africa in 2008 
(Percent of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on WDI (2016). 
 
Figure 7: The impact of crisis on personal remittances in top five recipients’ countries 
(Percent of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on WDI (2016) 
 
3.4 Official development assistance 
 
Official development assistance is another transmission channel that can affect sub-Saharan 
Africa. The region relies heavily on official aid flows compared with other regions. In fact, 
official aid flows is the largest source of external financing for the region, both in dollar 
amount and as a share of GDP. For example, in 2006, official aid flows to sub-Saharan 
African countries other than South Africa was US$37.5 billion.  It accounted for 8.2 percent 
of GDP, compared with 1 percent of GDP for other developing countries (see Ratha et al., 
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2008). In the low-income sub-Saharan African countries, official aid flows accounted for an 
average of 70 percent of resource flows over the past decade. In the middle-income sub-
Saharan African countries, it accounted for an average of 30 percent of resource flows during 
the same period (see Ratha et al. 2008).  Therefore, many countries in the region were 
vulnerable to the downturn of official aid flows. 
 
Some studies argued that the downturn of official aid flows was likely to happen after the 
financial crisis. It was because the developed donor countries, which experienced adverse 
macroeconomic conditions, need to finance billions on financial sector bailouts and their 
fiscal stimulus packages to sustain internal demand. As a result, they might be less likely to 
honor their commitments in their aid budgets to the developing countries (see Allen and 
Giovannetti, 2011; Esser, 2013). In the similar argument, empirical studies showed that 
official aid was pro-cyclical with both donor and recipient incomes (Bulíř and Hamann, 
2008). In addition, Pallage and Robe (2001), in a sample of 18 donors, showed that the co-
movements of total aid disbursements with donors’ output were positive for almost three-
quarters of donors during 1969 to 1995.  
 
In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, poverty-reducing initiatives across the world had led to 
sizable aid flows during the past decade. Official aid flow to this region excluding South 
Africa increased from US$13.3 billion in 2000 to US$35.4 billion in 2007. Furthermore, 
during the 2005 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit in Gleneagles, members agreed to double 
annual official aid flows to Africa by 2010. As a result of the 2005 G-8 commitment, it was 
expected to have an increase of official aid flows to the region by approximately US$21.48 
billion per year (in 2008 dollar) on top of the existing aid during the period of 2005 to 2010 
(see Arief et al., 2009). However, some of the donor countries such as France, Iceland and 
Italy reduced official aid to the region due to the financial crisis (Arief et al., 2009). Despite 
the total net official development assistance by Development Assistance Committee members 
continue to increase in real U.S. dollar terms in 2009 and 2010, the official aid for sub-
Saharan countries still fell short of the Gleneagles’ target (see Arief et al., 2009; OECD-
DAC, 2011).  
4. Conclusion 
The channels through which the global economic and financial turmoil affects sub-Saharan 
African countries can be classified into direct financial and indirect real transmission 
channels. Direct financial channels include the effects on capital markets (such as stock 
markets, bonds markets, and foreign exchange markets), banking sector, and private capital 
flows (such as foreign direct investment and portfolio investment). Indirect real transmission 
channels include effects through trade, tourism, workers’ remittances, and official 
development assistance. 
While all the sub-Saharan African countries were affected by the crisis, the magnitude of the 
impact varies depending on the stage of the development of financial system and the structure 
of the economy. It is clear that some countries were highly impacted either through real 
contagion or financial contagion. Generally, the countries that were strongly affected by the 
crisis are the net exporters and those with more financially developed markets. A key source 
of the crisis was regulatory failure, whereby big banks and financial institutions were allowed 
to undertake unreasonable risks by creating sophisticated financial instruments and products 
for market participants. Therefore, the central banks and various regulatory authorities must 
be cautious about the practices of financial institutions and intermediaries in sub-Saharan 
14 
 
African countries. Clear rules should be provided to safeguard the effective functioning of the 
financial systems. To break the spillover effects and future contagion of global economic and 
financial crisis in the sub-Saharan African countries, it is apparent that these countries 
become less-dependent on key advanced and emerging market economies. While this second 
implication appears somewhat challenging to attain, sub-Saharan African countries may 
implement growth-oriented policies in order to generate growth and rein in the gains from 
growth. If these countries are able to plough back the gains from growth in a sustainable 
manner, they are bound to become less-dependent on the advanced and emerging market 
economies. This will subsequently help in defending these countries from external shocks 
such as the financial crisis. In a nutshell, we must point out that our study is exploratory in 
nature and may therefore not provide an accurate assessing of the impact generated by the 
crisis on the sub-Saharan African countries. In order to gain accurate insight, we recommend 
future studies to build structural models and estimated the absolute sizes of the impact of the 
financial crisis on these economies. 
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